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ABSTRACT

ANALYZING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF GERMAN MILITARY
INTERVENTIONS: KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRAQ

By
Matthew Goduto
University of New Hampshire, December, 2018

Due to Germany’s militaristic past, anti-militarism and restraint are ingrained into German
society and political discourse. For close to fifty years following WWII, Germany did not deploy
its military in offensive missions. Why then, did Germany suddenly participate in a military
intervention in Kosovo? Following Kosovo, why did Germany also participate in the military
intervention in Afghanistan, but refuse to intervene in Iraq, just two years after the Afghanistan
intervention began? Related to these questions are how did Germany intervene in Kosovo and
Afghanistan and how did Germany oppose the Iraq war? And what were the consequences of the
interventions/non-intervention? This paper argues that Germany only intervenes when an
intervention is perceived as legitimate by German political elites and the German public. The
idea of legitimate interventions is directly derived from Germany’s historical experience.

vi.

I. Introduction: What is a Legitimate Military Intervention in the German Context?
Introduction
Since reunification in 1990, Germany has deployed its military from the Balkans to South Asia,
from Africa to the Middle East. One noticeable exception to German military interventions is the
2003 Iraq War. Under the stewardship of Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder and Außenminister
Joschka Fischer, Germany deployed the German military (Bundeswehr) in combat roles in the
NATO interventions in Kosovo and Afghanistan. But just two years after the Afghanistan
intervention began, Germany refused to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Why did
Germany intervene in Kosovo and Afghanistan, but not in Iraq? This paper argues that
legitimacy of interventions is the principal factor in determining German decision-making vis-àvis the use of military force.
The Kosovo and Afghanistan interventions were viewed as legitimate interventions in
Germany by the public and politicians; Iraq, however, was not. For the purposes of this paper, a
legitimate intervention is understood as satisfying some combination of legal, multilateral, and
pragmatic considerations in the German context. While no specific combination is necessary, a
legitimate intervention must satisfy at least two of the three criteria. Legal interventions abide by
the German constitution and international law. Multilateral means using international
organizations, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations
(UN). Pragmatism is whether the intervention is feasible, has a good probability of achieving
desired outcomes for Germany, and is commensurate with German interpretations of its
historical experience. These three factors are shaped by Germany’s construction of historical
memory. The construction of historical memory—or how Germans remember experiences—
informs German policy decisions and public opinion by shaping ideas about legality,
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pragmatism, and feasibility. Nazi era Germany has by far the largest impact on German historical
memory, but also important is Germany’s experience under occupation by both the Allies,
particularly the United States, and Soviets. Legality, multilateralism, and pragmatism determine
whether Germany intervenes, but the political and public debates surrounding the decision to
intervene shapes the form of German participation in the intervention. How Germany intervenes
leads to specific outcomes, which provide lessons for future debates about the use of force.
This chapter begins by discussing the methodology I use to answer the research
questions, then follows with a discussion of historical memory in the German context which lays
the groundwork for understanding the three criteria that constitute a legitimate military
intervention for Germans. The chapter then establishes the theoretical framework of the paper. In
other words, I define the three criteria, legality, multilateralism, and pragmatism, that make a
military intervention legitimate in the German context and the factors that produce those criteria.
Methodology
This thesis is an inductive and qualitative research project. Using Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq
as case studies, this paper analyzes (1) why Germany intervened in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and
not Iraq, (2) how Germany intervened in Kosovo and Afghanistan, how Germany opposed the
Iraq War, and (3) the impacts of the interventions in the former cases and the non-intervention in
Iraq, not only for Germany, but for NATO, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and German foreign relations.
This paper uses a variety of sources in its analysis, including many peer reviewed academic
journals as well as leading world news and investigative journalism organizations such as Der
Spiegel and Deutsche Welle. I utilize books written by experts on the subject in order to use the
best and most accurate information available. The NATO website and the German constitution
provide primary sources from a regional alliance organization and government documents.
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The variety of sources accurately cover the topic, as they were written by the leading
experts on Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, NATO, and Germany. Certain sources provide the proper
context of the German interventions by describing what led up to the German decision to
intervene in Kosovo and Afghanistan; namely the Bosnian intervention and German historical
experience and how Germany remembers its experience. In short, the variety and type of sources
provide credibility to the claims made in this thesis.
Germany is a unique, interesting, and valuable case to examine in the context of military
interventions, given its extremely militaristic past. The three cases selected to study, were chosen
deliberately for several reasons. Kosovo was the first use of the Bundeswehr in an offensive
capacity since WWII. Afghanistan was to date Germany’s largest military deployment since
WWII. The 2003 Iraq War was and remains a highly controversial event and Germany’s refusal
to participate was a notable decision which severely strained US-German relations. Additionally,
all three cases occurred under the same government led by Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder and
Außenminister Joschka Fischer. This allows for a consistent analysis, less subject to the
differences in political ideology of different political elites and parties. Furthermore, Kosovo and
Afghanistan represent two cases of intervention while Iraq is a case of non-intervention, allowing
for variance of cases in order to test the claims made in this thesis. Much of the literature on
these three cases was written in the immediate aftermath of Germany’s decisions. The benefit of
this project’s “late” analysis is that we can clearly see the consequences of the decisions well
after they happened, but not so far removed as to make the analysis no longer relevant. Scholars
can potentially apply the lessons learned from these three cases to more recent German decisionmaking such as Libya, Mali, and Syria. Finally, the analysis may prove useful to decision-makers
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when contemplating the use of military force. In sum, Germany is an excellent case to analyze
when discussing the use of military interventions as a foreign policy tool.
Historical Experience and German Memory
While many states ignore or dismiss the dark eras of their history, Germany chooses to confront
its past. Germans even developed a term specifically for this: Vergangenheitsbewältigung.
Vergangenheitsbewältigung translates to past coping or remembering the past so as not to repeat
its mistakes. Originally, the term referred to Nazi atrocities and WWII, but has since evolved to
encompass more German atrocities such as WWI. This term is reflected throughout German life,
in school curriculum, museums, statues, and memorials. Walking through the streets of any
German city or town, one will likely see Stolpersteine or stumbling stones, stones engraved with
the names of Nazi Holocaust victims. Or perhaps one will visit the Denkmal für die ermordeten
Jüden Europas, the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin. Whatever the case may
be, Germany’s infamous and militaristic past shapes German society even seven decades after
the fall of the Nazi regime. But historical memory in Germany is not limited to the death and
destruction Germany caused throughout its modern history, but also to what the German people
experienced under occupation after WWII.
Germans, specifically East Germans, suffered under a repressive regime. East Germans
had far fewer freedoms and a worse economy than their West German brethren. To this day, East
Germans are often viewed through negative stereotypes, as seen by the German slang terms
Ossis and Wessis, referring to East and West Germans respectively; Ossi generally holds a
negative connotation.1 Former East German cities and East Germans in general are economically

1

Jess Smee, ‘“Ossis aren’t Indians,’” Der Spiegel, April 16, 2010, accessed November 27, 2018,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-ossis-aren-t-indians-a-689403.html.
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worse off than West Germans even to this day.2 For instance the per capita GDP in the former
East Germany is just 67 percent of the former West Germany according to 2014 data.3
For many East Germans, their experience under occupation and the Soviets was largely
negative. West Germans on the other hand had mainly positive experiences under Allied
Occupation, and specifically with their American occupiers. US assistance created a “Special
Friendship” between Germany and the US.4 Additionally, US leadership after WWII recognized
that punitive reparations could result in the same conditions that allowed for the rise of the Nazis
in the first place and declined to impose those types of sanctions.5 The United States’ “mercy”
and assistance after WWII reserved a special spot in the minds of Germans, especially their
leaders. Whether one considers US-German relationships post-WWII a “Special Friendship” or a
dependency, US economic assistance and security, such as the Berlin Airlift and Marshall Plan,
resulted in positive experiences for West Germans creating strong ties between the two states
both politically and socially.6 Historical memory plays an exceedingly important role in German
society.
Legality
The Grundgesetz or Basic Law, Germany’s constitution, banned wars of aggression due to WWI
and WWII. Codified into the Grundgesetz is the commitment to peace. Article 26 (1) of the
Grundgesetz states that “acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful
relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, shall be

2

See Theresa Damm, et al., “So geht Einheit: Wie weit das einst geteilte Deutschland zussamengewachsen ist,”
Berlin-Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung (July 2005): https://www.berlininstitut.org/fileadmin/user_upload/So_geht_Einheit/BI_SoGehtEinheit_final_online.pdf.
3
“Germany’s reunification 25 years on,” The Economist, October 2, 2015, accessed November 19, 2018,
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2015/10/02/germanys-reunification-25-years-on.
4
Anika Leithner, Shaping German Foreign Policy: History, Memory, and National Interest (Boulder:
FirstForumPress, 2009), 53.
5
Leithner, Shaping German Foreign Policy…52-53.
6
See Leithner, Shaping German Foreign Policy…52-54.
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unconstitutional.”7 Despite clearly banning aggressive military actions, interpretations of the
constitution by the Bundesgerichtof, Germany’s highest court, authorized offensive actions.
Beginning in 1993, Germany contributed to a NATO enforced no-fly zone over Bosnia.8
The Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) or the Social Democrats, a left leaning
party (and others) challenged the constitutionality of Germany’s contribution to the no-fly zone.9
However, the Bundesgerichthof ruled in 1994 that the Bundeswehr can be deployed to foreign
countries so long as the deployment was in conjunction with multilateral treaty obligations, i.e.
those invoked by the United Nations, NATO, etc.10 This decision made offensive military actions
legal. The German public and politicians support using its military through multilateral actions
sanctioned by international institutions. Germany’s highest court’s decision to legitimize the use
of force so long as the military was used multilaterally, paved the way for the Bundeswehr’s use
in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Germans, due to their past, strongly believe in international law
especially when it comes to the use of force.
Multilateralism
The construction of historical memory profoundly shapes a group’s Weltanschauung, their world
view. This paper claims that two schools of thought best explain Germany’s relationship between
historical memory and its approach to the use of force: a commitment to multilateralism and to
universalism. Universalists do not believe in violent means as a tool for political action.11
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Grundgesetz Article 26, Section 1,
http://www.bundestag.de/blob/284870/ce0d03414872b427e57fccb703634dcd/basic_law-data.pdf.
8
Alister Miskimmon, “Falling into Line? Kosovo and the Course of German Foreign Policy,” International Affairs
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 85, no. 3 (May 2009): 562
9
Miskimmon, “Falling into Line…” 562.
10
Sebastian Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan? Germany and its forces in the Hindu Kush,” Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (November 2007): 2.
11
Martinson, “Rediscovering Historical Memory…” 393.

6

Universalism promotes “concerns ‘for the good of all mankind, world harmony, and world
peace.”’12 The belief in Universalism is seen by Article 26 (1).
Coordination with other states when acting, rather than unilateralism is another element
of how German society engages its historical responsibility. Multilateralism is a key determinate
of legitimacy in the eyes of Germans. While Germany had its allies during WWII, Germany
committed most of the fighting and atrocities. Germany unilaterally invaded several countries
causing brutal death and destruction. For Germany, post-WWII, unilateral military actions were
completely off limits. Szabo notes that “Germany’s calling since the catastrophe of Hitler had
been to create and sustain an effective multilateral approach to international problem solving.”13
In other words, global actors, particularly Germany should work multilaterally to resolve
pressing issues, especially military ones. A commitment to allies is also an important part of
multilateralism for Germans and is directly influenced by its unilateralism during WWII.
Germany’s commitment to not forgetting its past fostered the creation of institutions that
normalized antimilitarism.14 Germany does not spend a significant proportion of its government
budget on its military. German military spending during WWII took precedence and Germans
today fear the rise of a powerful and influential military. NATO members pledged in 2006 to
spend two percent of GDP on defense budgets.15 Despite this pledge, most NATO members do
not spend two percent on defense, including Germany, which spends 1.2 percent on defense.16 In
fact, Germany has not spent more than two percent of its GDP on defense since 1991;17 Germany

12

Ibid., 393.
Stephen F. Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings
Institution), 134-135.
14
Martinson, “Rediscovering Historical Memory…” 392.
15
“Military spending by NATO members,” The Economist, February 16, 2017, accessed August 17, 2018,
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2017/02/16/military-spending-by-nato-members.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
13
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is reluctant to spend money on its military, preferring to externalize costs to NATO, creating an
incentive for Germany to keep the alliance together as well as burden sharing.18 This limited
spending results in a lack of capabilities for the Bundeswehr, particularly offensive capabilities.
However, lack of capabilities does not impact Germany’s decision whether to intervene in these
three cases; it simply influences the role Germany takes within the intervention.
In addition to burden sharing and externalization of costs, Germany believes in being a
steadfast ally. Europe was wary of Germany following the Second World War, so Germany
needed to show its newfound allies that it was a reliable partner. German politicians believe in
Bündnissolidarität, alliance solidarity with all its NATO allies, especially the United States.19 In
short, Germany has historical and moral reasons for its strong belief in multilateralism, but
practical considerations also play an important role in this belief.
Pragmatism
As noted above, pragmatism in the German context means the intervention is feasible, can
achieve desired German outcomes, and follows German society’s interpretations of historical
memory. The most important element of pragmatism for Germany is the feasibility of the
intervention, not just in terms of odds of the intervention achieving its objectives, but also
whether the decision to intervene is politically viable.
Governments in liberal democracies are in theory responsive to their people. This is
especially true of Germany. Not only is Germany a parliamentary system, but every single
government in post-WWII history, except one, has been a coalition.20 Coalitions between two or

18

Leithner, Shaping German Foreign Policy…27.
Ibid., 64.
20
“A history of Germany’s coalition governments,” Deutsche Welle, accessed November 30, 2018,
https://www.dw.com/en/a-history-of-germanys-coalition-governments/g-41818483.
19
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more parties are fragile by their very nature, forcing all parties to bargain and compromise.21
Furthermore, parliamentary systems require consensus or at least close to it with foreign policy
decision-making.22 Key constituents including other party members and a party’s base also
constrain foreign policy decisions.
Even if representatives of the different actors within the coalition do meet (say, in a
cabinet), these individuals do not have the authority to commit the decision unit without
having first consulted the key members of those they represent. The power of these
leaders is, in effect, incomplete since it can be significantly restricted by the views of
constituents. Such constraint greatly complicates the ability of a coalition of actors to
achieve agreements.23
Additionally, junior members of coalitions wield disproportionate power. The Freie
Demokratische Partei (FDP) or Free Democrats, a libertarian leaning party, was a coalition
member in many German governments post-WWII despite generally garnering just 5-10 percent
of the vote.24 Despite the limited support from the electorate, the FDP was a good predictor of
government spending in many instances.25 The influence junior coalition partners have is
disproportionate to their size. While junior coalition partners wield significant influence, public
opinion and parties’ bases are also influential to them.
Parliamentary governments, especially coalition governments, are fragile. One party’s
withdrawal from the coalition will result in an end to the government and votes of no confidence
can be called at any time. This ever-looming threat forces politicians to be more responsive to
their party’s base. In Germany, foreign policy power is more concentrated in the executive than

21

See Joe D. Hagan et al., “Foreign Policy by Coalition: Deadlock, Compromise, and Anarchy,” International
Studies Review 3, no. 2 (2001): 169-216; David P. Auerswald & Stephen M. Saideman, “Coalition Governments in
Combat,” in NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2014), 141-176.
22
Juliet Kaarbo, “Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role of Junior Coalition Partners in
German and Israeli Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 4 (December 1996): 503.
23
Hagan, “Foreign Policy by Coalition…” 171.
24
Kaarbo, “Power and Influence in Foreign…” 504-505.
25
See Richard I. Hofferbert & Hans-Dieter Klingemann, “The Policy Impact of Party Programmes and Governor
Declarations in the Federal Republic of Germany,” European Journal of Political Research 18, (1990): 277-304.
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with parliament.26 However, due to coalitions, the legislature has influence over foreign policy
decisions, and voters have power over their party’s representatives, and thus voters hold some
influence over foreign policy decision-making.27 Notable examples of public opinion influencing
foreign policy in Germany include Ostpolitik and the 1991 Gulf War.28 In short, German political
parties are responsive to voters, giving voters a say in foreign policy decisions.
Conclusion
Germany’s aversion to militarism stems from its history. The memory of two World Wars and
the Holocaust makes Germans extremely hesitant to use the Bundeswehr. When Germany does
deploy the Bundeswehr, it does so only when the mission is perceived as legitimate. For German
public opinion and political party leaders, a military intervention is considered legitimate when it
satisfies some combination of two of the three criteria: legality, multilateralism, and pragmatism.
In the following three chapters, I examine the interventions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and the
non-intervention in Iraq through the lens of legitimacy of interventions in the German context.
Why did Germans deem Kosovo and Afghanistan legitimate, but not Iraq? Furthermore, what
were the consequences of participation in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and not participating in Iraq,
not only for Germany, but for all relevant actors. Finally, I examine how the lessons learned in
these three instances can be applied to future military interventions for Germany.

26
Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,” World
Politics 43, no. 4 (July 1991): 488.
27
Ibid., 488.
28
For Ostpolitik, see Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure…”; For the 1991 Gulf War, see Andrew
Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, et al., “Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War,” International Organization 48, no. 1
(Winter: 1994): 39-75.
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II. A More Assertive Germany: Operation Allied Force
Introduction
Germany’s decision to intervene in Kosovo was a monumental step towards the normalization of
the use of force for Germany. The intervention was the first time Germany had deployed its
military in an offensive mission since WWII. Given that the Grundgesetz explicitly bans wars of
aggression and Germany’s reluctance to use force to achieve foreign policy goals, why did
Germany intervene in Kosovo? Following Germany’s controversial decision to intervene, how
did Germany participate in the intervention and what outcomes did the type of German
participation lead to for Germany, Kosovo, and NATO? As I show in this chapter, Germany
intervened in Kosovo because the intervention was perceived as legitimate. Operation Allied
Force (OAF) was multilateral and pragmatic; however, the legality of the intervention is unclear.
Fulfilling the multilateral and pragmatic criteria made German participation in the intervention
acceptable. The public and political debates about the legality of the intervention and the
decision to intervene heavily shaped how Germany intervened. How Germany intervened made
German society more accepting of the use of force, strengthened the NATO alliance, and
contributed to Kosovo’s eventual independence.
Bosnia and the Grundgesetz
Beginning in 1993, NATO enforced a limited no-fly zone over Bosnia. Following the expansion
of that no-fly zone, Germany began its participation in the peacekeeping effort.29 While the
operation involved very little combat (less than ten offensive missions from 1993-1995 in which
Germany did not participate),30 the possibility of NATO aircraft to conduct airstrikes made the

29

Miskimmon, “Falling into Line…” 562.
Karl P. Mueller, “Denying Flight: Strategic Options for Employing No-Fly Zones,” Santa Monica: RAND Corp,
2013, 4.
30
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mission offensive. According to German law, German participation in the no-fly zone should
have been illegal because neither Germany or NATO were attacked. Likely due to electoral
politics, the SPD, Greens, and other parties, who were then out of power, challenged the
constitutionality of Germany’s participation, prompting the Bundesgerichthof to rule that an
offensive mission is legal so long as it is in conjunction with multilateral treaty obligations.31
Both the SPD and Greens opposed the deployment of German troops in the Bundestag.32
Operation Deny Flight, as it was called, was originally mandated by United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 781 which started the no-fly zone in 1992.33 This mission was
extended to NATO in 1993 by UNSCR 816.34 Not only was the operation made legal by the
Security Council Resolutions, but also by NATO enforcement of the no-fly zone. The NATO
intervention in Bosnia, and German participation, albeit extremely limited, paved the way for the
use of the Bundeswehr in Kosovo.
Why Did Germany Intervene in Kosovo?
In Kosovo, the population of Kosovar Albanians was persecuted by forces from the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), mainly ethnic Serbs. Before October 1998, approximately
250,000 Kosovar Albanians, or 12.7% of the population, were forced from their homes by Serb
security forces.35 From March to June 1999, an additional 863,000 Kosovar Albanians were
forcefully removed from their homes. It must be noted that Operation Allied Force lasted from

31

Sebastian Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan? Germany and its forces in the Hindu Kush,” Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (November 2007): 2; Miskimmon, “Falling into Line…” 562.
32
Alan Cowell, “Conflict in the Balkans: The Germans; As Germany Enters the Fray, Two Pilots Reflect an Altered
Military,” New York Times, July 17, 1995, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/17/world/conflict-balkans-germansgermany-enters-fray-two-pilots-reflect-altered-military.html.
33
Mueller, “Denying Flight…” 3.
34
Ibid., 4.
35
“Kosovo: Facts & Figures,” Frontline, accessed March 31, 2018,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/etc/facts.html.
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March to June 1999.36 Additionally, FRY forces committed atrocities in retaliation for attacks by
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a Kosovar Albanian rebel group. On 15 January 1999, Serb
forces massacred 45 Albanians.37 It was in this context that Germany felt it had to intervene.
Based on Germany’s hesitancy to use its military, especially considering Germany had
never used its military in an offensive capacity, it seems odd that Kosovo would be Germany’s
first offensive military intervention. While participation in the no-fly zone over Bosnia was
surprising, Germany took on a very limited support role, but in Kosovo, the German air force
conducted airstrikes. Operation Deny Flight had a UN mandate and the Bundesgerichthof’s
ruling made German participation constitutional. Operation Allied Force on the other hand was
unconstitutional, did not have a UN mandate, and no member of NATO invoked Article V of the
NATO charter. What made the intervention legitimate was that it was multilateral and pragmatic
from the German perspective. However, Germans were sharply divided on the issue and political
and public debates both were shaped by and shaped historical memory, which explain why
Germany intervened in Kosovo.
As noted, German historical memory shapes politics and society extensively. This is
especially true with the use of military force in the Balkans, a region that suffered horribly under
Nazi occupation. “For many in the (Social Democratic) Party – and in society in general --- the
idea that German soldiers […] would intervene once again in a region that had suffered so much
under German occupation during World War II was unbearable.”38 Approximately two-thirds of

36

Ibid.
“A Kosovo Chronology,” Frontline, accessed March 31, 2018,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/etc/cron.html.
38
“Schröder on Kosovo: ‘The Goal was Exclusively Humanitarian,’” Der Spiegel, October 25, 2006, accessed
March 31, 2018, http://www.spiegel.de/international/schroeder-on-kosovo-the-goal-was-exclusively-humanitariana-444727.html.
37
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respondents to a German poll stated their opposition to deploying the Bundeswehr to the
region.39
The debates over the intervention in Kosovo marked a shift in attitudes towards
legitimacy of interventions in Germany. German elites and public went from the belief in never
using military force again, to using military force for just causes. This belief in using the military
for good led to an obligation to “prevent human suffering resulting from warfare and
genocide.”40 A member of parliament supporting the German deployment to Bosnia stated: ‘“we
are all very much aware that Germany was liberated […] This results in the right and the duty to
liberate others or to bring freedom to others.”’41 This attitude is in stark contrast to Germany’s
checkbook diplomacy and ‘“Never again War”’ slogan of the first Persian Gulf War.42 In
essence, Germany wen from ‘“Never again War”’ during the 1991 Persian Gulf War and
Bosnian intervention to ‘“Never again Genocide”’ in Kosovo.43
A commitment to upholding human rights and recognizing historical memory was a
central theme of Gerhard Schröder’s government. In 1999, the Bundestag approved a memorial
for the murdered Jews of Europe.44 Schröder was also Germany’s representative at the 2000
International Holocaust Conference and he attended many Holocaust remembrance days in other
countries.45 During Schröder’s administration, the Bundestag established a committee for human
rights, established the position of human rights officer in the foreign ministry, founded the
German institute for Human Rights, and created a national plan for human rights.46 While many
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of these events took place after the Kosovo intervention, Schröder clearly felt historical memory
and human rights were important for Germany. This commitment outweighed his reservations
about the use of force. According to Schröder’s memoirs, two of the reasons Germany had to
participate in Operation Allied Force were “the negative consequences of Milosevic’s
policies…[and]…to atone for past German mistakes,” i.e. the Holocaust.47 In speeches to the
Bundestag, Schröder justified NATO’s actions and Germany’s support: “the alliance was
compelled to take this step in order to prevent further heavy and systematic infringement of
human rights”48 and because of Milosevic’s actions, the ‘“use of military force is necessary and
politically and morally justifiable.”’49
Schröder was supported by his foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, and the pragmatic
faction he led within the Greens. While the Green Party maintains a strict pacifist platform,
Fischer recognized the need for the use of force, particularly after witnessing the inaction in
Bosnia which led to crimes against humanity.50 Fischer’s devotion to human rights trumped his
pacifist beliefs:
[Schröder’s] foreign minister, Green Party head Joschka Fischer, didn't need much
convincing. Even as his party had prided itself as being devoted to pacifism and peace,
Fischer felt that German involvement was necessary, even if it was going to be a difficult
pill for his party to swallow. Still, the two agreed it was a necessary step to take.51
Despite the fragility of the SPD-Green coalition, Fischer believed upholding human rights was
more important than party politics. This however, led to a deep rift within the Green party,
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discussed later in this chapter. Altruistic reasons were not the only motivation behind Germany’s
support for the intervention. Like every state, Germany has strategic interests and generally
states participate in humanitarian interventions when their strategic interests and altruism align.52
After the fall of the Soviet Union, experts wondered whether NATO was a necessary
organization. In the words of NATO’s first Secretary-General, NATO’s purpose is “to keep the
Americans in [Europe], the Russians out [of Europe], and the Germans down.”53 By this point in
time, the Russians were no longer a threat and Germany was the most powerful country in
Europe; the only remaining reason for NATO was a transatlantic link.54 Many scholars note that
the Kosovo operation was a chance for NATO to show its viability as a security organization in
the post-Cold War world; it passed with flying colors.55 Germany also had a strong interest in
keeping the alliance alive due to burden sharing. Additionally, Germany had plans for European
Union expansion, but fears of many European states made enacting those plans difficult;56
Germany had to show it was a reliable partner, especially after refusing to contribute forces to
the First Gulf War. Being a reliable partner to NATO and the United States became more
important with the Afghanistan intervention, but began with Kosovo. It is also important to note
that Chancellor Kohl, Schröder’s predecessor committed to the Kosovo intervention in 1998,
prior to Schröder taking office. However, the new government had the choice to either continue
the German commitment or refuse to act in Kosovo.57
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While the intervention was illegal based on the German understanding of legality vis-àvis the use of military force, OAF satisfied the multilateral requirement. The intervention was a
NATO operation meaning Germany was supporting its multilateral treaty obligation. Fourteen of
the 19 members of NATO committed troops or aircraft to OAF58 and all 19 members of NATO
at the time contributed troops to the follow up peacekeeping operation, Kosovo Force (KFOR).59
Furthermore, the core five members of NATO, the US, UK, Germany, Italy, and France carried
out most of the airstrikes (see Table 1). Simply put, the Kosovo intervention clearly satisfied the
German multilateral requirement.
The third and final requirement to make a military intervention legitimate for Germany is
pragmatism. First and foremost, is the intervention feasible? In other words, can German
political elites say yes to the intervention while assuaging domestic public and political
concerns? While the German public was generally supportive of NATO airstrikes, they
overwhelmingly did not support ground troops (see Figure 1). The decision to intervene in
Kosovo nearly cost Fischer his Foreign Minister position which in turn would have ended the
Red-Green coalition and Schröder’s time in office.60 Many members of the SPD were also
against the intervention, costing Schröder support.61 From this perspective, the intervention was
barely feasible.
Stopping crimes against humanity was a priority for Germans, both the public and
political elites. NATO had the capacity and the will to bring overwhelming force to bear against
FRY forces making the likelihood of a drawn-out campaign or failure slim. The bombing
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campaign was a 78-day long success because it achieved the NATO objectives of stopping ethnic
cleansing and bringing Milosevic to the negotiating table. Not a single aircrew was lost during
the 38,000 sorties NATO flew and according to NATO, over 99 percent of all ordinance hit its
intended target.62 German participation also showed that it could be both more assertive in world
affairs and a reliable partner within NATO. The Kosovo intervention achieved desired outcomes.
German historical memory is continuously changing and being reinterpreted based on
current needs. The transformation from “Never again War” to “Never again Genocide”63
between the 1991 Gulf War and the Kosovo intervention exemplifies these changes. The Balkans
also suffered greatly under Nazi occupation making Germans and citizens of the region wary of
German intervention. The Kosovo intervention changed German perceptions about the legitimate
role of force, namely that the Bundeswehr was a force for good and could be used as such.
How Did Germany Intervene in Kosovo?
The debates surrounding the decision to intervene in Kosovo had tangible effects on how
Germany intervened in Kosovo. Before the war in Afghanistan, Operation Allied Force was
NATO’s largest mission. Public opinion led Germany to take more of a support role rather than
an active combat role. Of the core five members of NATO (US, UK, Germany, France, and
Italy), Germany committed by far the fewest aircraft and participated in the fewest number of
airstrikes (see Table 1). Despite the strong rhetorical support from Schröder and Fischer,
Germany’s material support was very limited. Germany’s lack of ground troops is directly
related to the fact that just 30% of Germans supported sending in ground troops.64 However,
public opinion changed throughout the course of the intervention (see Figure 1). Overall, support
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for the air campaign was relatively high according to Forsa Institut data and more split according
to Die Welt.
Schröder and Fischer, no doubt aware of the fragility of coalition governments and the
effects of war on public opinion and elections were constrained by public opinion. Germans did
not want German ground troops in Kosovo, nor were they overly supportive of German
airstrikes. Germans supported NATO airstrikes in general but were less supportive of German
airstrikes. Recognizing this, Schröder and Fischer limited Germany’s participation in the air
campaign to a support role and limited combat.
Table 1

Source: David P. Auerswald, “Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo,”
International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 3 (September 2004): 646.
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Figure 1. German Attitudes Towards the Kosovo Operation
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Source: Janice Bell, Dina Smeltz, and Steve Grant, “Update: Global Reaction to the Kosovo Crisis,” United States Information
Agency, last modified April 28, 1999, accessed March 29, 2018,
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However, Germany did participate in the peacekeeping mission following the
intervention. Following the bombing campaign, NATO began a peacekeeping operation in
Kosovo. Originally, the operation was comprised of some 50,000 troops,65 including 4,918
German soldiers by October 2001,66 down to just 408 soldiers as of March 2018.67 German
participation was far less controversial than the air campaign because it was a peacekeeping
operation and it was legitimated by UNSCR 1244, whereas the original bombing operation was
not despite the tacit approval of the UN Secretary General.68 Although Germans largely did not
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support providing German ground troops for combat operations, the peacekeeping mission had
more support.
Germany’s limited material support for the air war was in part due to domestic pressure
on Schröder and Fischer as well as the lack of political support within their parties. The pair had
used most, if not all their political capital just achieving German participation in OAF, so to push
for further involvement was likely unattainable. Additionally, the use of ground troops for
combat was out of the question as the German public had no desire for a ground war.
Peacekeeping was an entirely different story, as in the eyes of the public, peacekeeping was just,
and the Security Council’s approval provided legitimacy. Overall, the type of intervention
Germany took was forced on Schröder and Fischer due to public pressure. Both Schröder and
Fischer believed in constraints on the use of force, however without the public influence on the
mission, it is possible that Germany would have taken a larger combat role during the
intervention.
Consequences of the Intervention
Gerhard Schröder’s decision to intervene in Kosovo had a tremendous impact on German
politics, the population, and the Bundeswehr. Additionally, Operation Allied Force had
consequences for NATO and Kosovo. This section analyzes the consequences of the intervention
on German politics, public opinion, the German military, NATO, and on Kosovo.
The most important consequence of the Kosovo intervention for Germany was that the
intervention solidified the Bundesgerichthof’s ruling regarding the legality of interventions.
Despite the court’s ruling that offensive missions were constitutional so long as they were
through a multilateral treaty organization, this ruling was not fully accepted by political elites
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and the public. The Kosovo intervention ended any debate over the legality of offensive
missions.
Germany’s participation in the Kosovo intervention was an important step for Germany
to increase its role in world affairs. Kosovo made German politicians more willing to use force
abroad, especially since OAF was so successful. Operation Allied Force helped push German
participation in Afghanistan, which in turn led to further interventions in Mali and Syria. While
other factors were instrumental in Germany’s participation in Afghanistan, Mali, and Syria,
without the Kosovo intervention, it is questionable if Germany would have participated and what
role Germany would take on if they participated in those operations.
Fischer, however, was ostracized by members of his Green party; many members of the
party called for Fischer’s resignation. Chancellor Schröder’s Social Democrats also felt that the
party had departed from its anti-war stances of the Willy Brandt era. Afterall, just several years
earlier, the SPD challenged the constitutionality of Germany’s contribution to the Bosnia
mission. Germany’s increasing role on the international stage started under the chancellorship of
the right-wing Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl;69 its transformation was completed under the
left-leaning Schröder. German elites have also pushed for a permanent seat on the United
Nations Security Council and participation in Kosovo was partly a desire of Germany to
showcase why it should be a permanent member of the UNSC.70
The German public was decidedly split about German participation in OAF at the
beginning of the operation. However, as the operation wore on, the German population became
more supportive of the airstrikes and a small portion of the population became more supportive
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of the use of ground troops, although the majority of Germans did not support ground troops.
OAF showed Germans that the Bundeswehr could be a force for good and that a larger
international role for Germany may actually be positive for Germany and the world.71
Operation Allied Force was the first use of the Bundeswehr in an offensive capacity.
German forces saw their first taste of combat since WWII, setting in motion the buildup of the
military. The intervention in Kosovo showed just how limited the Bundeswehr’s capabilities
were,72 causing Schröder to develop a strategy to create a military that was no longer used solely
for defense. Germany attempted to reform the Bundeswehr several times throughout the 1990s,
but Kosovo and Afghanistan led to Schröder’s Defense Policy Guidelines (DPG).73 While the
DPG was never fully realized, Angela Merkel continued Schröder’a policy following her
election in 2005.74
The intervention also had important consequences for NATO. Some elites questioned the
need for NATO after the fall of the Soviet Union, while others wanted NATO to transform from
a defensive organization into an international security organization.75 The success of Operation
Allied Force proved the viability of NATO as an international security organization.
Furthermore, OAF was, at the time, NATO’s largest operation and first war.76 The NATO
coalition achieved all its objectives with stunning success.77 The success of the campaign
increased confidence of NATO members in the organization. Perhaps more importantly, Kosovo
forced the European members of NATO to assume more responsibility within the alliance,
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Kosovo after all, was in their backyard.78 Operation Allied Force laid the groundwork for future
NATO operations including in Afghanistan and Libya.
The impact of military interventions on the population of the country that is intervened in
is overlooked. OAF stopped the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and provided a future for the
territory. However, Kosovo faced many difficulties in the aftermath of the intervention. In the
immediate aftermath as the peacekeeping forces moved in, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
and others initiated reprisals against Serbs in Kosovo.79 Locals also preferred to use their nom de
guerre because it carried more prestige than their actual names.80 This made the transition to
peace more difficult because the population held onto symbols of war. Creating modern and
effective security forces was also a challenge. During the war, average Kosovar Albanians armed
themselves alongside the KLA, which made disarmament and the transformation of the KLA
into a disciplined force difficult.81 Furthermore, making security forces multiethnic is extremely
difficult as evidenced by Bosnia. Kosovo’s first police academy contained 200 recruits; 80%
were ethnic Albanian and 13% Serb.82 In an area that experienced severe ethnic cleansing, more
ethnic integration is needed to reconcile the past and create a better future.
More recent developments in Kosovo show that the country is making strides toward
success. In 2008, it declared independence from Serbia and is internationally recognized as a
sovereign state by the United States and many European Union members.83 Up until 2008,
Kosovo was under the administration of the United Nations, however it is now independent.84
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NATO’s peacekeeping mission is winding down as well. From the initial force of 50,000 troops,
just 4,500 remain as NATO continuously drew down its forces as the security situation
improved.85 Overall, Operation Allied Force was a net positive for Kosovo as today Kosovo
enjoys independence and a relatively stable security situation, as well as international support
from the US and EU.
Conclusion
Germany’s intervention in Kosovo was an historic event in post-reunification Germany. OAF
paved the way for future uses of the Bundeswehr abroad and increased German willingness to
take on a larger role on the international stage. Kosovo proved that the Bundeswehr could be
used to achieve “righteous” foreign policy goals and helped to normalize the use of force in
German politics and society. This process was started under Chancellor Kohl and became known
as “salami tactics;” that is, as Philippi put it, “cutting away slice after slice at Germany’s
hesitancy, one mission at a time.”86 This process continued in Afghanistan, discussed in the next
chapter. Germany participated in Operation Allied Force because it was both a multilateral and
pragmatic mission in the German context. Despite not being technically legal under Germany’s
constitution, the mission had the tacit approval of the UN Secretary General.87 All these factors
made the intervention legitimate in the eyes of Germans.
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III. Afghanistan: Germany’s Largest Military Mission since WWII
Introduction
Germany’s intervention in Afghanistan was its second military intervention since WWII. While
the Kosovo intervention was extremely controversial, the Afghanistan intervention was largely
uncontroversial due to the attacks of September 11th, but also for the reasons of legality and
multilateralism. Pragmatic considerations played a significant role in the type of intervention
Germany undertook in Afghanistan but was less important for Germany’s decision to intervene.
This chapter analyzes why Germany intervened in Afghanistan, how it intervened, and what
outcomes derived from the intervention for Germany, Afghanistan, and NATO. Overall, the
Afghanistan intervention was legal, multilateral, and pragmatic.
Why Did Germany Intervene in Afghanistan?
September 11th, 2001 was a defining moment in the United States, launching a new discourse—
the global war on terror—and a new set of military interventions focused on the Middle East.
Germany was not attacked by Al-Qaeda or any of its affiliates on September 11th. Based on this
narrow view of the attacks, Germany was prohibited from intervening in Afghanistan due to the
Grundgesetz. But as Bosnia and Kosovo showed, the Grundgesetz was not the sole legal
authority for the use of force. Should either NATO or the United Nations authorize the use of
force, then Germany could legally deploy troops. Both organizations did just that.
After the terrorist attacks on the United States, the US invoked Article V of the NATO
charter: “mutual defense”.88 Article V states that “an armed attack against one or more of [the
members] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and
consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the
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right of individual or collective self-defence.”89 In Germany’s eyes, the US was attacked;
therefore Germany had an obligation to support its ally in retaliation against those responsible.
NATO’s political decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council ruled that the 9/11 attacks
did in fact justify the invocation of Article V.90 This retaliation took the form of an armed
intervention against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan who harbored the Al-Qaeda terror
network. By supporting a NATO ally who was attacked and invoked Article V, Germany
demonstrated its reliability as a partner. Germany had a responsibility to be an unwavering ally.
Had Germany refused to support the US even after the use of Article V, the NATO alliance
would have been in serious jeopardy and US-German relations would have been in a state of
crisis. Afghanistan was Germany’s chance to repay the US for its “Special Friendship.”
Furthermore, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386, which built upon
UNSCR 1378 and 1383, authorized the creation of an International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) which Germany contributed to heavily, discussed later in this chapter.91 Both NATO and
the UN made the use of force legal for Germany. However, the ISAF mission was not the only
mission in Afghanistan. Following the attacks, the US responded with Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF). OEF’s main mission was counterterrorism; to hunt down Al-Qaeda and Taliban
militants. ISAF’s mission was concerned with rebuilding, or perhaps more accurately, building
an Afghan state. German special forces participated in OEF for several years at the beginning of
the intervention leading to public debate over Germany’s role in Afghanistan, discussed later in
the chapter. UNSCR 1386 only authorized the ISAF mission, not OEF therefore German
participation, although it was small, could be considered illegal. NATO’s contribution was to
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ISAF. While many members of NATO contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom, the
invocation of Article V did not specifically authorize NATO involvement in OEF.
The Afghanistan intervention was also undertaken multilaterally. At its height, ISAF had
over 87,000 troops from nearly 50 states. The United States took command of many provinces
and contributed the most troops, but many countries contributed significant numbers of troops.92
Fifty countries contributed to the ISAF mission and nine supplied at least 1,000 soldiers, with
Canada providing 950.93 Unlike in Kosovo, Germany had few if any strategic interests in
Afghanistan itself. The lack of strategic interests led to few specific goals within Afghanistan
other than contribution to stabilization and reconstruction, something Germans largely
supported.94 Germany strongly supported the US. Chancellor Schröder and most of the
Bundestag “promised the United States ‘unconditional solidarity’ right from the start, including
military assistance.”95
In sum, for Germany, Afghanistan was considered the most legitimate of the three
interventions studied in this thesis. Not only did NATO authorize the intervention, but the ISAF
mission also came directly from a UNSC resolution. Additionally, the intervention was clearly
multilateral as nearly 50 nations contributed troops to the ISAF mission, although the US
contributed the majority of troops. Finally, the intervention in Afghanistan was a way for
Germany to repay the United States for its “Special Friendship” as well as show that it was a
reliable ally.
How Did Germany Intervene in Afghanistan?
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Germany’s intervention can be aptly described as limited. Germany was dedicated to
reconstruction and stabilization efforts over military operations. Public opinion was the largest
driver of the emphasis on reconstruction efforts over combat. German resources were dedicated
to building up the Afghan government and Afghan security capabilities, rather than direct
engagement fighting the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Both German politicians and
citizens supported stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan rather than combat
operations.96 However, the longer the war dragged on, the less the public supported the war.
Domestic support for the war plummeted from 65 percent in 2005 to 37 percent in 2011.97
Beyond the simple fact that German involvement in the war dragged on for over a decade
without achieving its objectives, several incidents are likely to blame for the extreme drop in
support for the intervention. The first incident was in 2009, when former German Defense
Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg was the first German official to call the operation in
Afghanistan a ‘“war.”’98 Germans liked to believe that the Bundeswehr was ‘“building schools
and digging wells’” rather than taking and losing lives.99 But German forces had a combat role in
Afghanistan from early on in the war.
Two missions were conducted simultaneously in Afghanistan. Operation Enduring
Freedom was responsible for most of the combat in the country. German Special Forces, the
Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK), contributed to combat under OEF.100 Some 610 German
soldiers participated in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa.101 It
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is unclear how many troops participated in each location. Germans associated OEF with fueling
the insurgency and public opinion labelled OEF the ‘“bad”’ mission.102 It is unclear how well
KSK participation was known to the German public. It is unlikely that the German government
would make operations involving the KSK widely known for security reasons. German
involvement in OEF was heavily criticized even though the KSK ceased participating in OEF in
2005.103 Despite the KSK’s involvement in combat, the Bundeswehr did not have a large combat
role until much later in the intervention.104
The International Security Assistance Force was focused on building up Afghan
government institutions and security forces. Germany contributed the third largest contingent of
troops to ISAF (5,600 at its highest point)105 and Germany took control of Regional Command
North in Mazar-i-Sharif.106 The ISAF mission led to a slight increase in German willingness to
participate in combat operations, but the public was still largely not in favor of a combat role for
the Bundeswehr.107 German public support for combat remained low throughout the Afghanistan
intervention.
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Figure 2. ISAF Regional Command North

Source: “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures,” NATO, August 1, 2013, accessed October 19,
2018, https://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf.

As shown in Figure 2, the Bundeswehr was stationed in the northern Afghan provinces of Balkh
and Kunduz. Kunduz is located along the important NATO supply route into Tajikistan.108 Like
the rest of Afghanistan, Balkh and Kunduz are ethnically diverse.109 There are two key Afghan
actors related to northern Afghanistan. These actors mediate any intervention, control the allimportant patronage networks, where and how international assistance is distributed, and
influence local security because of their powerful militias. The first, Abdul Rashid Dostum, an
ethnic Uzbek, was a notorious warlord during the Afghan civil war in the 1990s110 and is
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currently the vice president of Afghanistan.111 Dostum was instrumental in assisting US Special
Forces in taking over northern Afghanistan and the all-important northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif.
Mir Alam Khan is the second important figure in the north. Alam was a commander in the
Northern Alliance, the main anti-Taliban force, during the Afghan Civil War who upon the fall
of the Taliban took control of Kunduz.112 Once in control, Alam divided up the province and
gave control to loyal local commanders; ethnic Pashtuns were almost completely excluded from
the division of Kunduz.113 Both Dostum and Alam are important because throughout
Afghanistan’s recent history, the same key figures appear again and again in influential
positions.
Germany’s main priority in northern Afghanistan was training Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF). Germany’s main concern in the region was destabilizing forces such as
insurgent groups and corruption. Afghanistan’s National Army (ANA) improved significantly
from its re-establishment in 2002. Based out of Mazar-i-Sharif, the ANA’s 209th Shaheen
“Falcon” Corps is responsible for nine northern Afghan provinces.114 Germany’s Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) was responsible for coordinating security with the 209th Corps as
well as assisting in training of the unit. While the ANA is important to the security of the region,
Afghan National Police (ANP) units are more important than the army units.
Afghan National Police are the second largest security force in Afghanistan. The ANP is
a force of 151,000 with various responsibilities throughout the country.115 Despite such a large
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force, the ANP numbered just 1,700 personnel in Kunduz.116 This led to severe security
problems throughout the province. Until 2009, northern Afghanistan was relatively safe as most
of the fighting was concentrated in the southern and eastern provinces. However, the Taliban
established a significant presence in Kunduz in the spring of 2009. German reluctance to fight
the Taliban (discussed further in this chapter) allowed the Taliban to successfully launch a wave
of attacks and deteriorate the security situation in Kunduz.117 The provincial government
requested further ANSF to assist in Kunduz however Kabul ignored both the Kunduz
government’s request for more security forces and the German recommendation for an additional
2,500 ANP personnel.118 Out of necessity and with German reservations the provincial
government turned to local militias for security.
Arbakai militias, while an effective fighting force, severely undermined the Afghan
government’s position in Kunduz. Essentially, the Arbakai were comprised of non-Pashtuns who
had previously fought the Taliban and were loyal to Mir Alam Khan.119 The Arbakai were
formed out of necessity; the security situation in Kunduz was deteriorating and the ANA and
ANP units either could not or were not improving the situation. The Taliban was driven out of
Kunduz, not because of fighting, but due to bribery.120 Despite the success of the militias, in
2015, a surprise Taliban offensive in the north gave the Taliban control of Kunduz city for 15
days.121 The security situation in Kunduz and northern Afghanistan as a whole remains
precarious.
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Germany’s concerns that the Arbakai would undermine the Afghan government’s
position in Kunduz proved correct. In 2011, funding for the Arbakai militias ceased and most
militias fought in power struggles and extorted the local population.122 ISAF and the central
government made efforts to replace the Arbakai militias. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) was
supposed to take over security responsibilities in Kunduz and the Arbakai were to be disarmed,
however this program was extremely unsuccessful; as of 2011 only 51 people had been
disarmed.123 In Kunduz, the Arbakai remain the true power brokers and it remains to be seen
whether this will further marginalize Pashtuns in the province.
German support for reconstruction efforts were high. Germany’s reconstruction bank, the
KfW Development Bank, funded many of the German reconstruction projects in Afghanistan.
The KfW invested five million Euros into constructing a pipeline network. two pump stations,
and a water tower that provide clean water to some 10,000 people in the town of Balkh.124 The
KfW’s report rated the project as satisfactory, noting that parts of it fell short of expectations.125
This project exemplifies Germany’s and others’ efforts to reconstruct Afghanistan.126
German public opinion largely dictated what type of intervention Germany would have in
Afghanistan, which shaped outcomes. The Afghan National Security Forces were unable to
effectively combat the Taliban so Arbakai militias were bought and the militias in turn bribed the
Taliban into submission. The initial success of the Arbakai was overshadowed by the Taliban
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taking control of Kunduz city for 15 days. Finally, reconstruction efforts have largely failed in
the north. A water pipeline was successful in Balkh province, but other projects have fallen short.
Few if any infrastructure projects have been attempted by external actors now that German
forces have left northern Afghanistan. The overall outlook for Kunduz, Balkh, and the Afghan
people is bleak.
Consequences of the Intervention
Afghanistan has been Germany’s most significant war experience since WWII. The Afghanistan
intervention has had far reaching implications particularly for the Bundeswehr, but also German
politics, the German public, NATO, and perhaps most importantly Afghanistan. These results
have shaped and will continue to influence German foreign and military policy.
While German forces first fought in Kosovo, German ground troops had never seen
combat. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Bundeswehr was transformed into a military
force with offensive capacities.127 The Kosovo intervention changed public perception of the use
of force and improved relations with NATO allies.128 However, the war in Afghanistan
completely changed the Bundeswehr’s capabilities. Germany’s first commander in Afghanistan,
Harald Kujat states
‘Afghanistan has been the most important experience for the German armed forces. It
was the first time since World War II that the German military was involved in real
combat action.’ […] the Afghanistan experience has created a new generation of young
officers with personal combat experience contributing to a ‘more self-confident’
Bundeswehr.129
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The German Defense Ministry attempted to increase the military’s capabilities with the Defense
White Paper of 2006 (the most recent version was updated in 2016).130 The Defense Ministry
attempted to evolve the Bundeswehr into a “highly deployable force.”131 Most experts, especially
current and former members of the military, argue that the German combat mission in
Afghanistan succeeded, but it was the political aspect that failed.
German politicians were hesitant for the Bundeswehr to take on a combat role in
Afghanistan, even going so far as to avoid calling the intervention in Afghanistan a war. German
soldiers claimed that there was a clear disconnect between the situation on the ground and the
information available to politicians in Berlin. Former Bundeswehr General Staff Officer and
current member of parliament Roderich Kiesewetter noted that “the military command did not
adequately communicate to the German political leadership what the actual situation on the
ground was – a war zone – and what equipment soldiers needed.”132 Communication between the
Bundeswehr and politicians has improved especially as former soldiers become members of the
government.133 The Afghanistan experience made politicians more willing to deploy German
troops around the world.134 German troops were deployed in the fight against the Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria (ISIS).135 Clearly, Afghanistan has given German politicians more confidence in
the ability of the military and paved the way for more use of the military abroad when German
strategic interests and objectives were clear and a limited military campaign was possible.
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On the other hand, the Afghanistan intervention has made policy makers more reluctant
to get involved in protracted wars overseas. Germany refused to participate in the Iraq War,
discussed in the following chapter as well as the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya. The
Afghanistan War was longer than WWII for Germany and Germany has no desire to participate
in long, drawn out conflicts, especially when there is no clear strategic interest for Germany or
endgame.
Mounting German casualties affected German support for the Afghanistan war. The
Bundeswehr lost 54 soldiers in Afghanistan with 35 of them dying in combat.136 While
politicians seem to support using the military selectively to achieve limited security goals abroad,
the German public is much more skeptical.137 Lagging public support is mostly explained by the
human costs of the war. Kiesewetter cited a 2009 airstrike ordered by German forces that left
well over 100 Afghan civilians dead as a turning point in declining support for the war. The
German public could no longer believe that German soldiers were building schools and hospitals
after German forces ordered the airstrikes. This public skepticism has also led to rifts within
NATO.
Germany was reluctant to be a full participant in combat operations in Afghanistan,
preferring instead to let the US, UK, and Canada do the bulk of the fighting. Despite having the
third largest ISAF contingent of troops,138 Germany placed heavy restrictions on what its forces
were able to do. For example, German forces could not leave their area-of-operation to assist
Norwegian forces that were in combat.139 The way NATO is structured allows for some
contributors to do less than others. Countries limit their troop contingent’s capabilities by not
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supplying certain assets.140 States also place restrictions on what their troops can and cannot do.
Germany placed some of the highest restrictions of any NATO member on its troops.141 The lack
of capabilities and the restrictions placed on each country’s contingents contributed to the
friction between NATO members in Afghanistan.
Not only did a lack of capabilities strain the alliance, but a perception that some countries
were not doing their part led to a rift between alliance members. NATO members of ISAF were
categorized into two groups by Noetzel and Schreer: “Warrior States” and “Ration Consumers”.
The “Warrior States” were the ones who did the fighting and thus suffered the most casualties in
Afghanistan.142 Germany was labelled a “Ration Consumer” because of their relatively few
responsibilities as well as the German contingent’s avoidance of combat operations. Countries
also tended not to share too much intelligence with other contingents and there was a clear lack
of coordination between contingents; “each country was fighting its own war.”143 The caveats
placed on the use of troops and force as well as a lack of coordination and cooperation caused a
significant strain on the alliance.
Oftentimes, the two separate missions, OEF and ISAF, were at odds with one another.
ISAF focused more on winning the “hearts and minds” of the population while OEF focused on
hunting down terrorists and insurgents. One of the favorite strategies of OEF was to conduct
night raids on suspected insurgent compounds. However, these night raids undermined efforts to
make the population more trusting of ISAF forces.144 The local population could not differentiate
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between the two missions; all of the forces were foreign. In short, Afghanistan severely strained
the NATO alliance.
The actual impact of the war in Afghanistan and its people is important as well. While
Germany and NATO have been affected greatly by the war in Afghanistan, the people of
Afghanistan have suffered more. Even prior to 2001, Afghanistan had been in a constant state of
war since 1979. Lofty promises made by foreign governments and others to rebuild Afghanistan
have failed. So, the question must be asked, are Afghans better off following the German
intervention? Simply put, no. Ethnic groups in Afghanistan have long been at odds with one
another and these ethnic divisions continue to plague the Afghan National Security Forces.
Ethnic groups are either overrepresented or underrepresented in all ranks of the ANA (See Figure
3). Ethnic groups who mostly populate the north like Tajiks are being used in operations in the
Pashtun dominated south where the Tajiks do not speak the language and are viewed as foreign
as ISAF troops.145 The ethnic composition of the ANA has led to fears of dominance by one
ethnic group over another.
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Figure 3. Ethnic Composition of the ANA

Source: Younossi, Obaid, Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Jonathan Vacarro, Jerry M. Sollinger, and Brian Grady. “The Long March: Building an Afghan
Army.” Rand Corporation (2009). Accessed October 17, 2016.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG845.pdf.

Civilians have suffered the most as a result of the current war in Afghanistan. The United
Nations first began tracking civilian casualties in Afghanistan in 2009. From the period of
January 1, 2009 to June 30, 2016, 22,941 civilians had been killed and another 40,993
wounded.146 Development projects in the north by Germany have been all but abandoned.
Afghan civilians will likely continue to suffer tremendously from poor governance, the Taliban
and other insurgent groups, and ethnic infighting once all or most Western forces exit
Afghanistan.
Germany’s intervention in Afghanistan has had profound impacts on the Bundeswehr,
German politics, German society, NATO, and Afghanistan itself. The Bundeswehr has
transformed itself from a defensive minded military organization into an offensively capable and
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combat experienced fighting force. Politicians in Germany have become both more likely to send
troops abroad and less likely to do so. German politicians are more willing to deploy troops
when the mission has clear and achievable objectives, and a slim chance of a protracted conflict.
Over a decade of war left the German public tired and wary of military interventions. Germany
and its NATO allies’ relationship have been strained significantly because of the Afghanistan
War. Finally, Afghanistan itself has suffered greatly from the intervention. Northern
Afghanistan’s residents are at best marginally better off than they were before the war.
Conclusion
The Afghanistan intervention was Germany’s largest deployment of troops in a combat mission
since WWII. Unsurprisingly, the intervention had far reaching impacts on Germany as well as
NATO and Afghanistan. The intervention in Afghanistan was seen as legitimate because it was
legal, multilateral, and pragmatic, as Germany understands those requirements. Germany’s
intervention was initially passive, focusing on reconstruction and stabilization efforts rather than
combat. Later in the intervention, this role changed leading to a significant drop in public support
for the war. Germany is both more and less willing to deploy its forces abroad as a result of the
Afghanistan experience. The NATO alliance was strained by the war and Afghanistan itself is at
best slightly better off than before the intervention. Furthermore, the “salami tactics” were
furthered in Afghanistan. In the two years before the Iraq War, Germany learned valuable
lessons from its experience in Afghanistan that influenced Germany’s decision not to intervene
in Iraq.
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IV. Germany Says No: The Iraq War
Introduction
During the build-up to the US war in Iraq, Gerhard Schröder and Germany’s lack of support for
the war were quite controversial. Germany chose not to intervene in Iraq because the war was
not legitimate in the German context. The war was not legal because it was a war of aggression
and therefore did not satisfy Germany’s constitutional requirement, was not authorized by the
United Nations Security Council, and no NATO member invoked Article V of the NATO
charter. Furthermore, the war was not multilateral as the US and UK provided the vast majority
of troops and no multilateral organization authorized the use of force. Finally, the Iraq war was
not pragmatic for Germany; Germany had no strategic interests in Iraq and Schröder was up for
re-election. This chapter analyzes the factors that determined Germany’s decision not to
participate in the Iraq intervention, how Germany opposed the war, and the consequences of
Germany’s opposition.
Why Did Germany Oppose the Iraq War?
Germany did not participate in the Iraq war because it was not legitimate based on the criteria
laid out in this thesis. The war was not legal, multilateral, or pragmatic and therefore made
German support and participation in the war impossible even if Chancellor Schröder wanted
Germany to fight in the war. While the Iraq war clearly and simply did not satisfy the legal and
multilateral criteria, the pragmatic considerations of Germany, especially Chancellor Schröder,
are critical in understanding Germany’s decision not to intervene.
The Iraq war was quite clearly illegal from the German perspective. Germany was not
attacked; therefore, it could not attack Iraq. However, as Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrated,
Germany could participate in wars of aggression so long as they were part of a multilateral treaty
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obligation: Iraq was not. While hotly contested in the United Nations, the Iraq war did not have
Security Council approval.147 As Chancellor Schröder stated, ‘“those who want to use military
force can only do so on the basis of the UN charter.”’148 Additionally, UNSCR 1441, while
recognizing Iraq’s failure to be transparent about its weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
program, did not authorize the use of force against Iraq.149 Despite US claims that Saddam
Hussein was connected to 9/11 and the Al-Qaeda terror network,150 this was patently false and
the US did not invoke Article V of the NATO charter in regard to Iraq, only Afghanistan. The
Iraq intervention was very clearly not legal in the German context.
In addition to not being legal, the Iraq war was also not multilateral. In Iraq, 44 nations
contributed troops at some point between 2003 and 2011, most of which were under the
command of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I).151 However, of those 44, only ten
contributed at least 1,000 troops, and the United States and United Kingdom provided by far the
most troops with, at their peak, 250,000 and 46,000 respectively.152 While this is roughly the
same number of nations who contributed at least 1,000 troops in Afghanistan, the Iraq war was
not multilateral because it was a “coalition of the willing,” not supported by a formal
organization like the ISAF mission under the auspices of both NATO and the UN. The “coalition
of the willing” was simply individual states who agreed to participate in the Iraq war, not a
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multilateral treaty organization. While NATO committed troops to training Iraqi security forces,
NATO provided only some 300 personnel and did not participate in combat like in Afghanistan.
Furthermore, the command structure was entirely different. Several members of the ISAF
mission commanded different regions and provinces of Afghanistan (see figure 2) and the overall
command of ISAF rotated between participating countries, but this was not the case in Iraq. In
Iraq, MNF-I was commanded by the US through the entirety of its existence, and the command
and control structure went directly from the US Secretary of Defense to US Central Command,
leaving little room for input from non-US members of MNF-I.153 Despite having roughly the
same number of troop contributing nations and nations that contributed at least 1,000 troops as in
Afghanistan, the Iraq war was not multilateral in the same way that Afghanistan was.
The United States invaded Iraq under the pretext that Saddam Hussein possessed
weapons of mass destruction and was linked to the September 11th terrorist attacks. Evidence of
WMDs was never found in Iraq.154 No concrete evidence existed or has ever been discovered to
support this idea, and both President Bush and Vice President Cheney admitted that Saddam
Hussein had no link to 9/11.155 Germany felt that the Bush administration was not forthcoming
in its claims of Iraq’s WMDs.156 Besides the lack of credible intelligence on the two key
justifications for the US war in Iraq, several other reasons prevented German participation in the
war.
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Germany had no clear strategic interests in Iraq making support for the war almost
nonexistent. But even in Afghanistan where the intervention was legitimate and Germany had
strategic interests, political support for the war was still split. In order to deploy troops to
Afghanistan, Schröder tied the decision to intervene to a vote of no confidence; Schröder won by
just two votes.157 While political motivations largely explain the closeness of the vote, the vote
still illustrates the limited support for the war. The Iraq war was not legitimate. Even if Schröder
had wanted to send German troops to Iraq, he simply did not have the political or public support
to do so. Beyond a lack of strategic interests, the objectives of the war were unclear.
Other than the removal of Saddam Hussein, US objectives in Iraq were unclear. The US’s
lack of a strategic plan for after it toppled Saddam’s regime, coupled with Germany’s disbelief in
the justifications for the war made German support impossible. The lessons Germany had
learned in to that point, the two years it had been fighting in Afghanistan taught Germany that
the scope and objectives of missions must be clearly defined beforehand. This was not the case
in Iraq. According to Schröder, “there needed to be an exit strategy” in Iraq.158
As discussed in the first chapter, Germany believes in restraint; war should be a last
resort. ‘“Germany does not reject the option of military steps but prefers a ‘civilian’ approach:
economic incentives and international cooperation among law enforcement authorities.’”159 In
the case of Iraq, Germany felt that not all options had been exhausted in preventing Saddam’s
pursuit of WMDs, therefore the military option was premature. According to Schröder, Fischer,
and other leading members of the SPD and Greens, weapons inspections work and they were the
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best path forward towards ending Iraq’s WMD program as well as avoiding war.160 Furthermore,
“given the limits of the military capacity of most European states, the use of force tends to be
impracticable or far down on the list of options.”161 For Germany, war in the case of Iraq was not
justifiable until all peaceful options were exhausted and to that point, the peaceful alternatives
had not been exhausted.
The most critical factor in explaining Germany’s decision not to intervene in Iraq is
Gerhard Schröder’s re-election campaign. In July of 2002, Schröder and the SPD were trailing in
the polls and his re-election prospects looked bleak.162 In order to boost his poll numbers and
garner support from the German public, Schröder began publicly hinting at a lack of German
support for the war in Iraq. Then, in a speech on 5 August, Schröder unequivocally stated that
Germany would not support, nor participate in a war with Iraq. ‘“We must get international
inspectors into Iraq. But playing games with war and military intervention—against that I can
only warn. This will happen without us…We are not available for adventures, and the time of
checkbook diplomacy is finally at an end.”’163 Schröder further cemented this view when he
stated: “Germany will not participate in [a war in Iraq] under my leadership,” while his opponent
Edmund Stoiber did not explicitly state his position.164 Schröder’s opposition to the Iraq war is
best summed up by respected journalist Steve Erlanger: “[Schröder] did this in part on principle,
and in part out of electoral opportunism in appealing to popular anger created by the Bush
[administration].”165 While Schröder did personally object to the Iraq War, it appears that
electoral politics was the reason for his clear opposition to the war. Had the German public
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supported the war, it is reasonable to think that Schröder may have supported the war publicly,
while still opposing it privately or at the very least not stating his position one way or the other
publicly.
Germany’s opposition to the Iraq war stems from the fact that the war was illegitimate in
the eyes of Germans. It was certainly not legal and although there was a “coalition of the
willing,” the coalition was not within the framework of a multilateral institution. Furthermore,
Germany had no strategic interests in Iraq, the pretexts for war were shaky at best, the war’s
objectives were unclear, and perhaps most importantly, Schröder’s re-election campaign
prevented any possibility of German support of or participation in the war. How Germany
opposed the war had serious implications for Germany’s relationship with several actors.
How did Germany Oppose the War?
Germans clearly opposed the war in Iraq. While German opposition itself was not the issue in
US-German relations, the way in which Germany, and particularly Gerhard Schröder and his
cabinet, openly criticized US policy vis-à-vis Iraq created a severe rift in US-German relations.
Germany’s very public and high-profile opposition to the war strained old relationships,
improved others, and forged new ones.
For George Bush and his highly personalized style of foreign affairs, Schröder and his
cabinet’s public personal attacks against Bush and his Iraq war policy created strong resentment
towards Germany. At first, Schröder did not rule out the use of force in Iraq to Bush but was
vague in what exactly would constitute the justifiable use of force.166 What followed was a series
of vague statements made by both Bush and Schröder about each one’s intentions regarding Iraq.
Schröder believed that Bush would inform him of any decision on Iraq and that the decision
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would not interfere with the German election.167 Following Schröder’s public statement of
opposition to the war and open criticisms of the Bush administration’s actions towards Iraq, US
rhetoric on Iraq became increasingly hostile, which in turn led to more vitriolic public statements
by members of Schröder’s cabinet. The SPD’s leading politician in the Bundestag compared
Bush to a Roman emperor and Schröder’s minister of justice likened Bush’s tactic of drumming
up support for the war as a distraction to domestic issues to Adolf Hitler, an unthinkable
comparison in post-war Germany.168 For the Bush administration, these public and high-profile
criticisms were unacceptable and unforgiveable.
Besides political opposition at the highest levels, the vast majority of Germans did not
support the Iraq war. In May of 2002, 61 percent of Germans “saw no legitimate reason for war;”
this number increased to 83 percent by February of 2003, just before the start of the war.169
German public attitudes towards the Iraq war and Schröder’s willingness to exploit these
attitudes for electoral gain further damaged the relationship between Germany and the United
States.
A second source of friction between the US and Germany stems from who Germany
chose to ally itself with in opposition to the war. France and Germany, historically competitors,
allied themselves publicly against US policy towards Iraq and France vowed to veto any UNSC
resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq.170 The German-French alliance Schröder and
French president Jacques Chirac forged led to US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to refer
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to the two countries as “old Europe,” an attempt to characterize France and Germany as
irrelevant.171
While Germany allying with France in opposition to the Iraq war was damaging to the
US position, what further hurt the US-German relationship was Germany allying with Russia.
Schröder pridefully boasted to fellow SPD members of Germany’s partnership with France and
Russia: ‘“Berlin is not as isolated as contended in Washington and elsewhere. Just the opposite:
ever more countries are coming behind the German position to give peace a chance.”’172 Neither
Bush nor Schröder were willing to reconcile with one another, preferring instead to continue to
attack the other side, especially Schröder as it helped his re-election chances.
Germany also worked within the UN, particularly the Security Council to garner support
for opposition to the Iraq war. While Germany does not have veto power in the security council,
it became the chairman of the UNSC in early February 2003,173 and strongly supported France,
Russia, and China, all of whom had veto power and opposed UN authorization for the war.174
Germany (and others) called for an accompanying resolution to UNSCR 1441 that authorized the
use of force175 knowing that the resolution would never pass due to French, Russian, and Chinese
opposition. Germany, France, and Russia strongly supported the UN weapons inspectors and
believed they needed more time to complete their work before military force was justified.176
While Germany’s public disparagement of the Bush administration’s stance on Iraq and more
importantly President Bush himself severely hurt US-German relations, Germany’s work with
others and in the UN was also important in straining the relationship.
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Consequences of Germany’s Opposition to the War
Germany’s decision not to intervene in Iraq had important outcomes for Germany, the United
States, and NATO. First and foremost, its active opposition to the war caused nearly irreparable
damage to high-level US-German relations. Schröder’s use of the Iraq war as an election issue as
well as senior cabinet members’ comments about President Bush and US policy all but ruined
the Bush-Schröder relationship. In two meetings following the official end of hostilities in Iraq,
Bush and Schröder attempted to fix their relationship. While the pair made strides, overall
neither fully settled their differences. As Schröder put it: ‘“we have a good working
relationship.”’177 George Bush had a highly personalized style of politics that relied upon good
relationships and respect. After the German election and the back and forth between the two
administrations, Bush would never again hold Schröder in high regard. The two continue to hold
one another in low esteem to this day.178
It is important to acknowledge that despite the large differences between the two leaders
and their administrations, US-German trade did not suffer and both countries continued close
coordination of their militaries and intelligence services.179 The Schröder-Bush relationship did
not affect military operations in Afghanistan or elsewhere. For example, Germany:
allowed the United States unconstrained use of its bases in Germany and provided
security for them. It expanded its military role in Afghanistan to include almost
2,000 troops [at that time] and assumed command of the ISAF once the force came under
NATO’s authority. It also contributed to a new NATO Reaction Force, which
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was established after the Prague NATO summit in the fall of 2002 to undertake
counterterrorism operations. In short, Germany’s political and diplomatic opposition to
the war did not impede its military cooperation in efforts outside Iraq.180
Despite the bitterness between the leaders over Iraq, US and German cooperation on issues other
than Iraq remained strong.
While opposition to the war damaged US-German relations, opposition brought Germany
closer to France. As noted earlier, France held veto power in the Security Council and Germany
supported France’s threats to veto a resolution that authorized the use of force in Iraq. Germany
and France promised to work in close cooperation on other issues facing the two countries.181
Germany’s relationship with France improved despite Jacques Chirac’s very open support of
Stoiber.182 While Russia was important to Germany’s opposition, the Iraq war did not have any
significant long-term effects on German-Russian relations.
Even though NATO did not participate in the Iraq war, many members of NATO did,
especially the newer members of NATO or countries who had NATO aspirations, located in
eastern Europe. The Vilnius 10, eastern European countries looking to join NATO and the EU,
offered their support to the US in Iraq.183 Relations between the US and supporting members of
NATO, specifically the UK, Spain, and Italy, as well as the NATO hopefuls in eastern Europe
improved greatly because of their support for the war. A brief crisis hurt the credibility of NATO
when Germany, France, and Belgium all blocked a move to provide Turkey, a NATO member,
with preemptive aid in the event Iraq attacked Turkey.184 The crisis did not have any long-term
effects on NATO, but in the build-up to the Iraq war, further strained relations within NATO.
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The Iraq war was a low point for NATO after arguably its high point just two years earlier when
NATO rallied around the US after the 9/11 attacks.
German politics were affected greatly by Germany’s opposition to the war. Gerhard
Schröder’s public refusal to participate in the war as well as his and senior cabinet ministers’
remarks about the Bush administration won him significant support from the German public.
This support was one of the main reasons why Schröder won re-election. As mentioned
previously, Schröder’s opponent Edmund Stoiber, while against the Iraq war, did not make his
stance as clearly known as Schröder hurting his chances in the election. In the end, Schröder won
re-election by just 6,000 votes.185 Germany’s refusal to follow the United States into Iraq also
built upon Schröder’s electoral promise of a deutscher Weg, German path, Schröder’s attempt to
have German policy be more independent of the United States, while also maintaining its
multilateral approach.186 The deutscher Weg was largely supported by the German public.187 It is
possible, this ‘German path’ led to Germany’s refusal to participate in the NATO intervention in
Libya while simultaneously allowing Germany to contribute troops to assist the French and
Malian militaries. The impact of Schröder’s refusal to participate in or support the Iraq war quite
clearly helped determine the outcome of an election.
Of course, the effects of the war on Iraq cannot be overlooked. The Iraq war and
subsequent withdrawal of foreign troops has been an unmitigated disaster for Iraq. The Watson
Institute of International and Public Affairs at Brown University estimates that 165,000 Iraqi
civilians have been killed as a direct result of the war from 2003 to 2015.188 The country has also
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been plagued by sectarian violence and Iraqi security forces crumbled in the face of attacks by
ISIS. While ISIS has largely been defeated and Iraqi forces have regained control of Iraq, the
costs of that violence are untold. It is impossible to speculate about the course of the war if
Germany had participated. Overall, the Iraqi people are better off without Saddam Hussein in
power, but their lives are only marginally improved due to the violence and poor future prospects
of the country.
Conclusion
Germany refused to participate in the Iraq war for the very clear reasons that the war was not
legal, multilateral, or pragmatic. The Schröder government was very public and critical in its
comments regarding the Iraq war and the Bush administration. Germany and its allies argued
against the US invasion in NATO and the UN, leading to strained relationships between the US
and Germany as well as between NATO members. While Gerhard Schröder personally disagreed
with the Iraq war, his electoral opportunism led to public denouncements of the war. Besides the
strained German relations, the lack of participation in the war paved the way for a deutscher
Weg, a foreign policy much more independent of the United States. The Bush-Schröder
relationship remained rocky as did US-German relations at the senior level until Angela
Merkel’s election in 2005, which led to a normalization of US-German relations.
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V. Conclusion
Summary of the Cases
Germany’s decision to intervene in Kosovo was a critical historical juncture for Germany. This
was the first time that Germany had used its military in an offensive mission since WWII. While
highly controversial and hotly contested by German elites and the public, the Kosovo
intervention was ultimately deemed legitimate by German elites and public opinion because the
intervention was multilateral, legal, and had pragmatic outcomes. The Kosovo intervention was
NATO sanctioned, but not sanctioned by the UN. However due to interpretations of the
Grundgesetz, the fact that NATO sanctioned the intervention satisfied the legal criteria for the
Schröder government. As I showed in Chapter II, Germany’s historical experience of causing
severe death and destruction in the Balkans during WWII as well as Milosevic’s policies of
ethnic cleansing shaped the political and public debates surrounding the intervention. Stopping
the Serbian crimes against humanity was Germany’s ultimate goal and one that was achievable,
making the intervention pragmatic. Because the decision to intervene was so controversial,
Germany participated in a very limited offensive capacity. Germany’s experience during the
intervention taught Germans that the Bundeswehr could be used as a force for good and a strictly
passive foreign policy approach was no longer practical in the post-Cold War era. Furthermore,
the success of the intervention and the cooperation amongst NATO members made Germany
more willing to use force in Afghanistan.
While Kosovo did not satisfy the legal criteria in the sense that it was not sanctioned by
the UN, the Afghanistan intervention was viewed as the most legitimate of the three discussed in
this thesis. Not only was the Afghanistan intervention sanctioned by both NATO and the UN, but
almost 50 NATO and non-NATO members contributed troops to the International Security
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Assistance Force mission.189 The Afghanistan intervention very clearly satisfied the legal and
multilateral criteria for German policymakers. Germany’s strategic interests in Afghanistan itself
were largely non-existent, rather Germany felt it had to support its longstanding ally, the United
States and repay the US for its “Special Friendship.” In Kosovo, Germany had clear goals, but
this was not the case in Afghanistan. Solidarity and support for the US trumped Germany’s lack
of attainable goals in Afghanistan, making the lack of clear goals irrelevant. While Kosovo
showed Germans that the military could be used for good, Germans were still quite hesitant to
contribute troops and insisted on contributing to reconstruction efforts, not combat. Germany’s
refusal to participate in combat until later in the war caused serious tension amongst NATO
allies and resulted in significant outcomes for Germany and Afghanistan explored in Chapter III.
Despite the “Special Friendship” playing a pivotal role in securing German participation in
Afghanistan, this was not the case for Germany during the build-up to the Iraq intervention.
In the eyes of Germans, the Iraq intervention satisfied none of the criteria needed to make
it a legitimate intervention. First and foremost, as seen in the debates surrounding the Iraq war,
the United States had no legal backing to invade Iraq. Neither the UN or NATO passed a
resolution in support of the intervention. Despite the Bush administration’s insistence that the
United States had a coalition of the willing, this group of countries did not adequately satisfy
German policymakers’ definition of multilateralism. Finally, Germany felt it had no strategic
interests in Iraq nor were the US’s goals attainable; the Iraq intervention did not meet the
pragmatic criteria. Germany’s opposition to the war, but more specifically how it publicly
opposed the Bush administration at the highest levels, led to a severely strained relationship
between Bush and Schröder. Despite this, US-German relations remained strong in areas not
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involving Iraq, such as trade and military and intelligence cooperation. However, Germany
forged a close relationship with France due to France’s opposition of the war. Relations within
NATO were also negatively affected by opposition to the war from Germany, France, and
Belgium. Even though NATO members had strained relations with one another, there did not
appear to be long-term effects from this. German politics were the most affected by the Iraq war.
Chancellor Schröder’s opposition to the war is largely credited for his re-election. Finally, the
Iraq war was disastrous for the Iraqi people and the region as a whole. The rise of ISIS is directly
tied to the US invasion of Iraq. Simply put, the Iraq intervention was not a legitimate
intervention for Germans.
Final Thoughts, Future Research, and Shortcomings
The three cases I examined in this paper provided insight into the German decision-making
process vis-à-vis the use of military force. Clearly, legitimacy in the German context is the main
determinant of whether Germany participates in military interventions. There is not necessarily a
certain combination of the three criteria, legality, multilateralism, and pragmatism, that makes an
intervention legitimate, but some combination is necessary for Germany to deploy the
Bundeswehr in an offensive action. None of the criteria also appear to be more important than
the others. However, the Schröder governments’ decisions in the three cases is directly linked to
the three criteria of legitimacy and the factors that influence those criteria, namely historical
memory, domestic politics, and public opinion.
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq were ideal cases to analyze because the decisions to
intervene or not intervene were all made by the same government. Additionally, the cases
provide variance making the results more generalizable at least to other German interventions.
Future research could test the results of this thesis by using Germany’s decision not to intervene
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in the NATO intervention in Libya as well as Germany’s contribution to the French mission in
Mali and to the anti-ISIS coalition in the Middle East. Like the three cases examined here, those
cases would be beneficial to study because the decisions all occurred under the Merkel
government and contain variance. The Mali and anti-ISIS cases had limited German involvement
which mainly consisted of a support role not combat. Even with this fact, the results of those
cases could further strengthen the arguments made in this paper.
I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the shortcomings of this project. While the list
of sources I used was extensive and covered a wide variety, I did not have first person interviews
because they were simply not feasible. Interviews with key decision-makers as well as key actors
within NATO and the countries analyzed would further flesh out the arguments made and
provide even more insight. However, due to time and other practical considerations, it was not
possible to conduct interviews. Despite the lack of interviews, the arguments I made in this paper
are strong.
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